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Entrepreneurs of firms who decide to raise funds from capital
markets have considerable discretion in choosing an appropriate
capital structure. They must decide, for example, whether to sell
common or preferred stock, issue secured or unsecured debt, or un-
dertake some combination of the above.' They also must decide
what the voting rights of the various classes of investors will be.
One important decision that must be made is under what cir-
cumstances, if any, classes of investors other than common stock-
holders will have the right to vote. Another important decision is
what the voting rules will be for common stockholders. Some of the
possibilities include one share-one vote, cumulative voting, or mul-
tiple classes of common stock with unequal voting rights. Multiple
classes of common stock with unequal voting rights are commonly
referred to as dual class common stock.
Whatever voting rules are selected, it is possible to alter the
rules in the future in light of changed circumstances. Thus cumula-
tive or dual class voting might be eliminated or implemented, not-
withstanding the prior rule, if certain previously agreed upon pro-
cedures are followed (typically approval of the proposed change by
shareholders).
The laws of many states-including Delaware, the state in
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which most firms incorporate-impose only the most minimal reg-
ulation on the choice of voting rules.2 Dual class voting, like cumu-
lative voting and virtually all other possible voting schemes, is
neither prohibited nor required.3 The voting rules are considered
to be a matter of private contract between the firm and its various
types of investors.
The organized exchanges have taken several approaches to-
ward dual class voting. The National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) has placed no restrictions on the trading of dual
classes of common stock on its automated quotation system (NAS-
DAQ). The American Stock Exchange (AMEX) allows the trading
of dual classes of common stock, provided that the inferior voting
stock has some voting rights.4 Historically, the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) is at the opposite extreme from the NASD.
Since 1926, the NYSE has prohibited listed firms from issuing any
type of dual class common stock.5
In recent years, however, there has been considerable debate
among member firms on the NYSE whether to retain the prohibi-
tion against dual class common stock. In January, 1985, an advi-
sory committee recommended to the Board of Directors of the
NYSE that the exchange allow the trading of dual class common
stock in certain situations.6 Although the NYSE decided in June,
1986 to accept the advisory committee's recommendation,7 the
change will not be effective until approved by the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
The current controversy concerning dual class common stock
also has attracted the attention of Congress. Legislation has been
introduced in both houses of Congress that would require the
NASD and the AMEX to adopt the historic NYSE prohibition on
the trading of dual class common stock. The stated justification for
the proposed legislation is that the ability of exchanges to choose
different rules regarding the trading of dual class common stock
will lead all exchanges to adopt the rule that is most detrimental to
2 See, e.g., 8 Del. Code §§ 151(a), 221 (firms permitted to give shares any number of
votes and to give votes to bondholders in addition to, or instead of, shareholders); 8 Del.
Code § 214 (cumulative voting optional).
' See generally Annot., Validity of Variations from One Share-One Vote Rule Under
Modern Corporate Law, 3 ALR 4th 1204 (1981).
4 See American Stock Exchange Company Guide § 122.
See NYSE Listed Company Manual § 313.
6 See NYSE Dual Class Capitalization: Initial Report of the Subcommittee on Share-
holder Participation and Qualitative Listing Standards (Jan. 3, 1985).
7See Big Board Agrees to Let Companies List More Than One Class of Common
Stock, Wall St. J. 2, col. 3 (July 7, 1986).
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investors. By preventing this "race to the bottom" among ex-
changes and forcing all exchanges to adopt the NYSE's prohibition
on trading of dual class common stock, the argument runs, the pro-
posed legislation will protect investors.
The NYSE itself has endorsed this "race to the bottom" argu-
ment in explaining the departure from its historic prohibition on
the listing of dual class common stock. The NYSE has stated that
it would prefer to retain the prohibition, but only if other ex-
changes adopted the prohibition or were forced to do so by federal
regulation."
This article analyzes whether exchange rules permitting the
trading of dual class common stock are economically beneficial to
investors and whether federal regulation is necessary to protect in-
vestors from such exchange rules. Part I discusses the role of ex-
changes and the incentives of exchanges to offer the type of trans-
action and ancillary services that investors want. The "race to the
bottom" thesis is critically analyzed in part II. Part III discusses
the reasons why some firms might choose to have dual class com-
mon stock in light of the economic theory of voting; it also summa-
rizes the available empirical evidence. Part IV analyzes the rela-
tionship between dual class common stock and the current debate
concerning defensive tactics in response to takeovers. Part V dis-
cusses the effects of a change in the NYSE's historic prohibition on
the listing of dual class common stock. Part VI is a conclusion.
I. VOTING RULES AND THE ROLE OF ORGANIZED STOCK EXCHANGES
A. The Economic Function of Exchanges
Stock exchanges facilitate transactions between buyers and
sellers of securities. They do this by providing a centralized loca-
tion, such as an exchange floor, for trades to take place or by pro-
viding an electronic system to perform the same function. As with
all marketplaces, the primary benefit of exchanges is that they save
traders the cost of independently searching for someone on the
other side of the transaction.9 A competitive broker or arbitrager in
' See NYSE News Release, NYSE Directors Approve Amendment to Allow Dual Clas-
ses of Common Stock for Listed Companies (July 3, 1986); Impact of Corporate Takeovers,
Testimony of the NYSE to the Securities Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 1110-1234 (June 12, 1985); NYSE
News Release, New York Stock Exchange Reaffirms Commitment to the Highest Standards
of Corporate Democracy (May 22, 1985).
' There is little fundamental difference between the economic role of a stock exchange
and that of any ordinary shopping center or flea market. All facilitate trading by bringing
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the market demands less of a discount when purchasing a security
and charges less of a premium when selling a security if, on aver-
age, he does not have to hold it in inventory for very long or incur
large search costs to find buyers and sellers. The lower costs are
reflected in low bid/ask spreads and high liquidity.
A related benefit is that organized exchanges provide a forum
that allows customer orders to be executed with minimum delay.
Thus brokers can usually execute a customer's order quickly be-
cause the exchange provides swift access to other buyers and sell-
ers. This immediacy is extremely important for purchasers and
sellers of securities since prices can move between the time of the
order and the time the transaction is consummated. By providing
liquidity, exchanges minimize the risk of price fluctuations borne
by investors during trading delays.
In addition to providing a centralized location or electronic
system to facilitate trades of securities, exchanges provide a set of
ancillary services. For example, exchanges police the conduct of
member firms to ensure that they are adequately capitalized, do
not act fraudulently toward consumers, or otherwise act in ways
that harm the reputation of the exchange. Exchanges also may
promulgate rules for listed firms governing financial disclosure, an-
nual meetings, or corporate structure.
Exchanges market these transaction and ancillary services by
selling access to a trading floor or to an electronic quotation sys-
tem. The NYSE is run for profit and access to the system is availa-
ble to members holding one or more of a limited number of seats
(and in recent years a small number of nonmembers). The AMEX
and regional exchanges are organized along similar lines. The
"over-the-counter" NASDAQ trading system, by contrast, is owned
by the NASD, a non-profit organization, which places no limits on
the number of members and charges members fees depending on
the level of services they select from the electronic quotation and
trading system.
The value of access to an exchange is a function of the com-
mission income (and trading profits) that can be earned by mem-
bers. This income is in turn a function of the ability of the ex-
change to attract listings and facilitate trading of securities of
listed companies. The higher the quality of transactional and ancil-
lary services (at a given cost) the more listings will occur and the
more investors will be willing to trade. For this reason, exchanges
together buyers and sellers in a known location and thereby reducing search costs.
[54:119
Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock
have strong incentives to provide transactional and ancillary ser-
vices that are in the best interests of investors.
In this sense, exchanges face the same incentives to provide
high-quality products (i.e., transactional services) as any other bus-
iness. Just as a manufacturer of automobiles has strong incentives
to make a product that consumers want in order to maximize its
profitability, an exchange has incentives to design transactional
and ancillary services that investors prefer. 10
B. The Incentive of Exchanges to Adopt Voting Rules that
Maximize Investors' Welfare
The choice of which, if any, voting rules to implement is one
of countless decisions exchanges must make in designing customer
services. Exchanges have strong incentives to make these deci-
sions-including those about voting rules-in investors' best inter-
ests to maximize their own profitability."' In addition to these in-
centives, certain characteristics of exchanges and voting rules
ensure that exchanges will not be able to fool investors into believ-
ing they are purchasing high-quality transactional services when
they are in fact buying services of poor quality.12 These character-
istics can be summarized as follows:
1. Observability. The more observable a particular product
characteristic, the less likely consumers will be fooled. It is ex-
tremely difficult to deceive consumers with respect to the number
of rooms in a house, for example, because consumers can ascertain
the truth by counting the rooms themselves. At the other extreme
are product characteristics that are very difficult to observe. A rep-
resentation by an automobile mechanic that a given part should be
replaced once the car has been taken in for other work, for exam-
"0 The analogy between exchanges and other types of sellers is developed in Daniel R.
Fischel and Sanford J. Grossman, Customer Protection in Futures and Securities Markets, 4
J. Futures Markets 273 (1984).
" This conclusion does not depend on whether the market for exchanges is competi-
tive. Monopolists, like firms operating in competitive markets, have incentives to offer the
level of quality that consumers demand. See id. at 283.
12 There is now a large body of literature on what conditions will facilitate informed
judgments by consumers or investors as to product quality. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Reg-
ulatory Conflict and Entry Regulation of New Futures Contracts, 59 J. Bus. 85 (1986);
Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of
Investors, 70 Va. L. Rev. 669 (1984); Alan Schwartz and Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in
Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 630 (1979); Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. Pol. Econ. 729 (1974);
Michael R. Darby and Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16
J. L. & Econ. 67 (1973); Richard A. Posner, Regulation of Advertising by the FTC (1973).
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ple, is notoriously difficult to verify at low cost. As a result, the
probability that consumers will be misled in this situation is much
higher than in the matter of house size.
In terms of observability, the choice of voting rules is much
closer to house size than to the condition of automobile parts. The
rules chosen by a particular exchange are a matter of public record
and thus completely observable.' s Accordingly, it is unlikely that
exchanges will be able to dupe investors by implementing voting
rules that operate to their detriment.
2. Reputation of the seller. The greater a seller's stake in
maintaining a reputation for honesty and fair dealing, the less
likely the seller will engage in deceptive practices. A well-estab-
lished large department store is less likely to misrepresent product
quality than a transient street vendor selling the same product.
Organized exchanges have strong incentives to maintain good
reputations. The long-run profitability of an exchange is highly de-
pendent on trading volume, which will fall if consumers doubt the
exchange's integrity. It is clearly in the interest of exchanges to
promote consumer confidence by policing abuses by members that
cause investors to lose money-at least to the extent that policing
is economically feasible. Accordingly, it is in the interest of ex-
changes to choose voting rules that prevent investors from being
exploited. If voting rules allowed by an exchange produced system-
atic exploitation of investors, investors would lose confidence in
the exchange, and the exchange would lose trading volume as in-
vestors took their business elsewhere.
3. Repeat transactions. Maintaining a good reputation is
most important when repeat transactions are contemplated: the
more important future business is, the greater the costs are of los-
ing it through damage to reputation. Victims of abusive practices
are not likely to be repeat players in the same game. An organized
exchange, by definition, is dependent on repeat business for sur-
vival; it is thus less likely to abuse investors.
4. The Role of informed investors. Informed traders or con-
sumers reduce the probability that an exchange or other type of
seller will be able to misrepresent product quality. If an exchange
adopts voting rules detrimental to investors, informed traders may
refuse to transact at all (which may cause the exchange to fail) or
13 It makes no difference whether all investors are aware of the voting rules of an ex-
change. So long as a sufficient number of investors are aware of the rule, its effects will be
reflected in prices and the exchange will behave as if everyone were informed. See note 14
and accompanying text below.
[54:119
Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock
only transact on terms that reflect the probability of the abusive
practice (which would reduce the exchange's profitability). Because
uninformed market participants commonly transact on the same
terms as those who are informed, the uninformed will be protected
by the monitoring of exchange rules by the informed-including
rules governing voting rights.
Therefore, the relevant inquiry in assessing the need for regu-
latory intervention in the choice of voting rules is not whether all
investors are informed; rather, it is whether enough are informed
so that the exchanges act as if all investors are informed.1" Institu-
tional investors, financial intermediaries, and wealthy individuals
are responsible for a high (and increasing) percentage of trading on
organized exchanges. The actions of these sophisticated market
participants-in deciding what securities to purchase and on what
terms-lead exchanges to adopt rules that benefit all investors.
5. Competition among sellers. If one exchange were to imple-
ment voting rules that harmed investors, other exchanges then
would have incentives to correct this mistake to attract listings and
volume away from the first exchange. This competitive pressure
also creates incentives on the part of exchanges to adopt rules that
investors want. 5
C. Differences Among Exchanges
That exchanges have incentives to offer transactional and an-
cillary services that investors demand does not imply that all ex-
changes will be identical. On the contrary, it is common in most
markets for different firms to cater to a particular group of con-
sumers. The different strategies followed by firms imply nothing
more than specialization within a market. The decision to manu-
facture luxury cars, for example, is not inherently superior to the
decision to manufacture compact cars. Differences among ex-
changes can be analyzed along the same lines. Although the NASD,
NYSE, and AMEX all provide transactional and ancillary services,
there are differences among them. One such difference is the
14 For a more general discussion of this point, see Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern
Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. L. 1
(1982).
5 With improved technology, the exchanges are now much more competitive than they
previously were. See Gary C. Sanger and John J. McConnell, Stock Exchange Listings, Firm
Value and Security Market Efficiency: The Impact of NASDAQ, 21 J. Fin. Quant. Anal. 1
(1986); John J. McConnell and Gary C. Sanger, A Trading Strategy for New Listings on the
NYSE, Jan.-Feb. 1984 Fin. Anal. J. 34. However, as discussed above at note 11, even a
monopolist has strong incentives to offer a level of quality that consumers demand.
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NYSE's historic policy of refusing to list the securities of firms
with dual class common stock compared with the opposite policy
of the NASD. But this is only one of the many differences. The
exchanges also have different listing and delisting standards, as
well as different requirements for listed firms. 6
Probably the most important difference among exchanges is in
their trading technologies. The NYSE uses a "specialist system" to
match buy and sell orders for each security. The specialist is
charged with the responsibility of maintaining an "orderly" mar-
ket, in addition to acting as a transactional intermediary. In prac-
tice this means he attempts to moderate price changes by buying
or selling for his own account.
In contrast to the NYSE, the NASDAQ system maintains
competitive "market makers." These are firms committed to an-
nouncing at all times prices at which they will buy or sell a mini-
mum number of shares of a stock. Decentralized market forces
thus ensure that prices will move quickly and accurately to reflect
all available information.
The differences among exchanges, however, are becoming in-
creasingly blurred. For example, while the specialist and competi-
tive market maker system appear to be dramatically different,
most large trading on both the NYSE and the NASDAQ is done in
a nearly identical manner in the "upstairs" market. A broker deal-
ing in a large block of stock will call other dealers and institutions
to find one interested in the other end of the deal. The specialist
on the floor of the NYSE, the subject of much attention, actually
serves as a market maker only for the residual small blocks and
odd lots of stock, as well as a backup broker for floor traders.
The governance rules imposed by exchanges also appear to be
moving in the same direction. In July of 1985, for example, the
NASD (perhaps in response to regulatory pressure) proposed rules
requiring listed firms to have an audit committee and a certain
number of independent directors. These requirements are similar
to those imposed by the NYSE. In other areas, the NYSE has
moved in the direction of the NASD. One example of this develop-
ment is the abolition of fixed commission rates.17 Another example
10 For example, the NYSE generally requires that listing companies have an annual
income of at least $2.5 million and an aggregate market value of stock that is greater than
$18 million, with at least 1.1 million public shares held by at least 2,000 investors with 100
or more shares. In contrast, NASDAQ requires only that a firm have $2 million in assets,
with 100,000 shares held by at least 300 shareholders. See NYSE, Fact Book 35 (1986);
NASD, NASDAQ Fact Book 16 (1984).
17 For a discussion of the deregulation of brokerage commissions, see Gregg A. Jarrell,
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is the suspension by the NYSE of its prohibition of the listing of
securities of firms with dual class common stock.
Notwithstanding these developments, basic differences among
the exchanges remain. The differences in trading technologies, list-
ing requirements, and governance rules reflect the different strate-
gies of the exchanges. The NYSE has attempted to attract large,
mature firms, while the NASD has tailored its NASDAQ system to
the needs of smaller, more entrepreneurial firms. The rules and
trading technologies of each exchange reflect the set of conditions
best suited for the firms listing on the exchange. Since firms issu-
ing stock differ, the best exchange rules for them will differ as well.
II. THE "RACE TO THE BoTToM" THESIS
Critics of competition among exchanges argue that efforts by
exchanges to attract listings leads them to adopt pro-management
rules to the detriment of investors. These critics assume that since
corporate managers decide whether and where to list, they will
base their decision on which exchange offers them the greatest op-
portunity to exploit investors. If one exchange relaxes its rules, and
allows this exploitation to occur, the argument runs, other ex-
changes will be forced to follow suit to avoid a drain of their list-
ings to the first exchange. The result is a "race to the bottom" in
which all exchanges end up with similar (pro-management, anti-
shareholder) rules.18
The argument that competition among lawmaking bodies
leads to a "race to the bottom" is not a new one. The identical
argument was made in the past to support the replacement of state
chartering of corporations by federal chartering. It was in this ear-
lier debate that the phrase "race to the bottom" originated. 19
Under a system of state chartering, it was argued, competition
among states to attract incorporations causes states to adopt in-
creasingly pro-management, anti-investor rules. The claim was
that only federal chartering of corporations or federal legislation
setting minimum standards could protect investors from the ad-
verse consequences of "lax" state corporation laws.
In connection with this proposal for federal chartering of cor-
porations, the "race to the bottom" thesis has been vigorously ana-
Change at the Exchange: The Causes and Effects of Deregulation, 27 J. L. & Econ. 273
(1984).
18 See note 8 and accompanying text above.
" See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
Yale L. J. 663 (1974).
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lyzed and discredited on both a theoretical and an empirical
level.20 The analogous argument that competition among ex-
changes in their choice of voting rules is harmful to investors is
equally without merit.
A. The Assumptions Underlying the "Race to the Bottom"
Thesis
The argument that competition leads exchanges to adopt anti-
investor rules to attract listings is based on at least three related
misconceptions: (1) that managers prefer exchange rules that allow
them to exploit investors; (2) that it is in the interests of exchanges
to adopt such rules; and (3) that the absence of regulation is neces-
sarily evidence of a pro-management, anti-investor bias. These
three misconceptions are discussed below.
1. Managers' incentives. Entrepreneurs or corporate manag-
ers who attempt to raise equity capital must convince investors
that the securities being sold at the price offered are superior to
alternative uses of investment dollars. These alternative uses are
almost infinite in number. Investors can purchase equity or debt
securities of other firms, put their money in a bank, buy govern-
ment securities, invest in real estate, purchase gold or other pre-
cious metals, and so forth. The greater investors perceive the
probability that they will be exploited-that the funds invested
will be used to benefit the managers at the expense of inves-
tors-the more attractive competing investments will become. Al-
ternatively, investors simply may pay less for securities when they
perceive that managers' discretion will be too great.
Thus, in an efficient market it is entrepreneurs seeking to raise
capital, and not investors, who bear the costs of inefficient rules
that allow investors to be exploited.21 The greater the inefficiency,
the less willing potential investors will be to invest and the lower
20 See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of
the Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251 (1977); Barry D. Baysinger and Henry N. Butler, The
Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm, 28 J. L. & Econ. 179 (1985); Roberta
Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L. Econ. & Org.
225 (1985); Peter Dodd and Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Un-
healthy Competition" versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980); Daniel R. Fischel,
The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's
Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 913 (1982). But see Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P.
Miller, Toward an Interest Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 Tex L. Rev.
(forthcoming 1987) (arguing that managers have some very limited discretion to act to the
detriment of investors in choosing a state of incorporation).
21 Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).
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the price investors will be willing to pay. This will increase the en-
trepreneurs' cost of capital but will not harm investors who dis-
count the inefficiency by paying a lower price.
To decrease their cost of capital, entrepreneurs have strong in-
centives to adopt rules or governance mechanisms that allay inves-
tors' concerns. These rules or governance mechanisms can take a
variety of forms as will be demonstrated in part IV below. Manag-
ers also have strong incentives to decide where to incorporate
based on which set of state laws is suitable for the particular needs
of their firm. Similarly, they will decide whether and where to list
based on which exchange will further the interests of their inves-
tors. Entrepreneurs have every incentive to adopt rules, including
the decision of which exchange rules to be governed by, in the best
interests of investors in order to lower their cost of capital.
The logical fallacy in the "race to the bottom" thesis is that it
assumes that managers will seek exchanges that facilitate the ex-
ploitation of investors. This strategy will only work if investors as a
class are irrational or completely ignorant. Why else would inves-
tors, notwithstanding the virtually infinite number of investment
alternatives, continue to entrust their money to managers who seek
rules that allow investors to be exploited? The assumption that in-
vestors as a class are completely ignorant or irrational, however, is
implausible in light of the observability of exchange rules and the
increasing dominance of institutional investors and financial in-
termediaries. Once investors as a class are assumed to be rational,
the incentive of managers to choose exchanges that maximize, not
minimize, investors' welfare in order to lower their cost of capital
is compelling. And competition among exchanges, by providing
managers with more choices in choosing an exchange with rules
suited to the needs of a particular firm, allows the cost of capital to
be lowered further.
2. The Incentives of exchanges. Even if we assume that the
managers of some firms intend to expropriate the wealth of their
stockholders, it still does not follow that it is in the interest of the
exchange to allow this expropriation to occur. Exchanges do not
compete for listings per se, but rather seek to maximize the volume
of trade, which is a function of the number of listings and the
amount of trading in listed securities. As we saw above, it is not in
the best interest of the exchange to allow exploitation of investors.
If an exchange allows managers of some firms to exploit inves-
tors, investors will lose confidence in the exchange, as a whole,
causing all firms on the exchange to face higher costs of capital.
This in turn will decrease the amount of listings in the future and
1987]
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thus also will reduce the amount of trade. Loss of confidence in the
exchange also will lead to a decline in the value of currently listed
securities. A decline in the value of listed securities, like a decline
in the amount of trade, will decrease income from commissions.
And any action that decreases commission income will decrease the
value of membership on the exchange. Thus, any decrease in the
amount of trade or value of securities listed on the exchange
reduces the wealth of member firms. Once again, it is clear that the
profit-maximizing strategy for an exchange is to promulgate rules
that maximize, not minimize, investors' welfare.
3. The relationship between regulation and investors' wel-
fare. A final misconception accompanying the "race to the bottom"
thesis is that it is possible to identify the "bottom" by determining
which jurisdiction or exchange is the least regulatory. But to
equate the level of investor protection with the amount of regula-
tion is a serious error. Consumers or investors do not necessarily
benefit from regulation. 2
For example, few today would argue that the NYSE was alone
in protecting investors because it had a policy of fixed commission
rates while the other exchanges did not.2 3 Nor would many argue
that the abolition of this regulation-which was justified in large
part as a device to protect investors and which was abandoned as a
result of competition from other markets-represented an example
of the race to the bottom. Similarly, the fact that one exchange
has, for example, stricter disclosure requirements may mean that
investors of firms on that exchange must bear costs of regulation
that exceed its benefits, costs not borne by investors of firms on
other exchanges. If competition in this situation forces the first ex-
change to drop the regulation, investors benefit.24
The inaccuracy of equating regulation with the protection of
22 Several economists have concluded that the widespread assumption that investors
have benefited from securities regulation is not supported by the empirical evidence. See,
e.g., Susan M. Phillips and J. Richard Zecher, The SEC and the Public Interest (1981); Greg
A. Jarrell, The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of the Market for New Security
Issues, 24 J. L. & Econ. 613 (1981); George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock
Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 Am. Econ. Rev. 132
(1973); George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117 (1964).
For the opposite perspective, see Irwin Friend, Economic and Equity Aspects of Securities
Regulation (Working Paper No. 7-82, Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania 1982). For a review of this evidence, see Easterbrook and Fischel, 70
Va. L. Rev. 669 (cited in note 12). On the economics of regulation generally, see Stephen
Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform (1982).
23 See Jarrell, 27 J. L. & Econ. at 276 (cited in note 17).
24 Conversely, competition among exchanges in other situations may force exchanges to
adopt regulations.
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investors is further demonstrated by two related factors that have
special relevance to dual class voting.2 5 First, particular regulations
can have mixed effects. A prohibition of dual class voting may pro-
tect investors in some instances yet harm them in others. Whether
a prohibition is desirable depends in large part on a weighing of
these costs and benefits. For the reasons discussed above, ex-
changes have strong incentives to weigh these costs and benefits
and strike the appropriate balance.
Second, no reason exists to believe that one type of regulation
is optimal for all firms. Some types of firms might benefit from
rules allowing dual class common stock while others might not.
Just as we observe successful firms incorporated in jurisdictions
with strict state laws and equally successful firms incorporated in
jurisdictions with liberal state laws, so too may firms listed on ex-
changes with one set of governance rules be as successful as firms
on exchanges with another set of governance rules. Both types of
exchanges may be optimal for the firms choosing to list on them.
B. The Empirical Evidence
Proponents of the "race to the bottom" thesis assume that
managers' decisions to list on exchanges that prohibit dual class
common stock (or are more regulatory in other ways) will benefit
investors. Analogously, proponents of this thesis in the state char-
tering debate assume that incorporation in Delaware, the jurisdic-
tion that for decades afforded managers the greatest discretion,
will harm investors.
These are testable propositions. If the hypothesis that the
rules of enabling jurisdictions such as Delaware are promanage-
ment and anti-investor is correct, then firms that reincorporate in
Delaware should experience lower stock prices. The evidence, how-
ever, is to the contrary.26 Similarly, if the NYSE protects investors
while other exchanges do not, the decision by firms to switch their
listing to the NYSE should be perceived as good news by investors.
Numerous studies have attempted to measure the gains, if
any, from listing on the NYSE rather than being traded over the
counter or listed on other exchanges.2 7 After adjusting for move-
25 Both of these factors are discussed in greater detail in part III below.
26 See Dodd and Leftwich, 53 J. Bus. at 261 (cited in note 20); Romano, 1 J. L. Econ. &
Org. at 255 (cited in note 20); Baysinger and Butler, 28 J. L. & Econ. at 188 (cited in note
20).
27 See, e.g., Sanger and McConnell, 21 J. Fin. Quant. Anal. 1 (cited in note 15); Louis
W. Ying, Wilbur G. Lewellen, Gary G. Schlarbaum, and Ronald C. Lease, Stock Exchange
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ments in the overall market, these studies generally find that firms
newly listed on the NYSE tend to have abnormally favorable per-
formance in the months prior to the announcement to list, normal
performance at the time of announcement, abnormally positive
performance between the announcement and the eventual listing,
and abnormally negative performance after listing.
Overall, this combination of normal, positive, and negative
performance for different periods surrounding the listing decision
suggests that the evidence does not point unambiguously to any
conclusion on the effect of listing on the NYSE on investors'
wealth. The absence of a statistically significant positive reaction
to the announcement to list on the NYSE,28 the most direct test of
how investors perceive the change in listing, only reinforces this
conclusion.
The inconclusive nature of the empirical results has significant
implications for the "race to the bottom" thesis. Proponents of the
thesis assume that the NYSE is a haven for rules that protect
stockholders, and that the other exchanges are the "bottom" be-
cause they do not have these protective rules. If this were true, we
would expect that rational investors would be willing to pay signifi-
cantly more for a stock that listed on the NYSE. This proposition
is not supported by the existing evidence.
Two caveats are in order. First, the evidence must be inter-
preted with considerable caution because it is impossible to disen-
tangle investors' perceptions of the differences in trading technolo-
gies from their perceptions regarding governance rules. Second, the
immense success of the NYSE over long periods of time suggests
that there must be benefits to listing there for many
firms-notwithstanding the inconclusive findings of studies to
date. Of course, the identical point can be made in connection with
the NASDAQ system, which also has enjoyed spectacular success.
Both exchanges appear to be providing transactional and ancillary
services that are well suited to the needs of their respective firms.
Listings and Securities Returns, 12 J. Fin. Quant. Anal. 415 (1977); James C. Van Home,
New Listings and Their Price Behavior, 25 J. Fin. 783 (1970). See also McConnell and
Sanger, Jan.-Feb. 1984 Fin. Anal. J. 34 (cited in note 15).
t' Sanger and McConnell test whether the effect of listing on the NYSE has changed
after the introduction of the NASDAQ system. They find that price response to the an-
nouncement to list on the NYSE is positive before and after the introduction of NASDAQ,
but statistically significant only in the pre-NASDAQ period. Sanger and McConnell, 21 J.
Fin. Quant. Anal. at 22 (cited in note 15). They conclude that the superiority of the NYSE
in providing transactional services has diminished significantly with the introduction of
NASDAQ. Id. at 22-23.
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III. DuAL CLASS COMMON STOCK AND THE ECONOMICS OF
SHAREHOLDER VOTING
In designing a firm's capital structure, managers must choose
voting rules. This section discusses the economics of shareholder
voting and the criteria that determine whether a rule of one share,
one vote or dual class voting is optimal for a particular firm. It also
summarizes the empirical evidence regarding the costs and benefits
of dual class voting.
A. Voting as a Monitoring Mechanism
Publicly held corporations are characterized by a separation of
the functions of management and risk bearing. This separation en-
ables skilled managers to run businesses-even though they lack
the personal wealth to finance all of the firm's investment projects;
it also enables those who have wealth to invest it-even though
they lack managerial skills. This specialization of function also en-
ables investors to diversify their portfolios, thus reducing risk and
making investment more attractive.
While the separation of management and risk bearing allows
investors to capture the benefits of specialization of function, it
also exposes them to the risk that their funds will be used for man-
agers' personal benefit. Market forces such as competition in prod-
uct and labor markets limit the ability of managers to engage in
behavior that does not maximize the wealth of the
firm29-although they do not eliminate it entirely. In anticipation
of the prospect of such behavior, investors will discount the price
they are willing to pay for shares. To minimize the size of this dis-
count, those who raise capital have incentives to establish institu-
tional arrangements whereby the performance of managers is con-
tinually monitored.
Voting rules are one type of monitoring mechanism.30 The
right to vote provides shareholders with the opportunity to decide
whether their agents have performed well enough to continue in
office. Typically, voting rules also force managers to obtain the ap-
proval of investors for certain fundamental decisions such as merg-
ers or amendments to the corporate charter. Thus, the right to
vote acts as a constraint on the ability of managers to take actions
11 See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. Pol. Econ.
288 (1980).
3* For a more complete discussion of voting as a monitoring mechanism, see Frank H.
Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. & Econ. 395 (1983).
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that harm investors.
But voting is a very imperfect monitoring mechanism. Many
shareholders are passive investors who hold many different invest-
ments. They have little interest in managing the firm and insuffi-
cient incentive to learn the details of management. Moreover, any
attempt by shareholders to monitor managers is likely to fail be-
cause of the serious problems of collective action and free riders.
No shareholder can capture the full gains from monitoring a firm's
managers. The benefits from such monitoring efforts will accrue to
investors according to the size of their holdings, not according to
their monitoring efforts. Because other shareholders can take a free
ride on the monitoring efforts of any one shareholder, no individ-
ual shareholder has much of an incentive to expend resources in
monitoring managers. As a result, shareholders routinely vote for
incumbent managers and approve management-sponsored initia-
tives in all but the rarest of cases.
The one important exception where voting does matter is in
contests for corporate control-mergers, proxy fights, or tender of-
fers. Contestants in the market for corporate control typically ac-
cumulate large blocks of stock; this in turn reduces the free rider
problem. Holders of large blocks of shares have a sufficient interest
in the firm to participate actively in management decisions and to
terminate managers who are behaving inefficiently. The ability to
vote, and thereby control who will manage the firm's assets, is fun-
damental to the incentive to acquire large blocks of shares in bat-
tles for corporate control.
Many other forms of monitoring arrangements exist.3 1 Exam-
ples are the sale of securities through investment bankers, the re-
tention of third-party accountants to verify financial statements,
and the use of independent directors. Still another method of mon-
itoring is to tie managerial compensation to firm performance. This
can be accomplished if managers own a large percentage of the
outstanding stock or if changes in compensation are linked to the
success of the firm.
Rules, whether a product of state law, federal law, or exchange
rules, also can minimize divergences of interest between managers
and investors. Such rules are beneficial when they economize on
the cost of contracting. The economic justification for the rule
l These alternative monitoring arrangements are discussed at length in Daniel R. Fis-
chel and Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate
Law A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 261 (1986); Easterbrook and
Fischel, 70 Va. L. Rev. 669 (cited in note 12).
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against fraud, for example, is that it saves the parties the costs of
negotiating and drafting contractual provisions to prohibit the
practice.
Significantly, all of these monitoring mechanisms impose costs
as well as create benefits. Independent directors, for example, are
likely to be more impartial but also less competent. In some cases,
the costs of less informed and more bureaucratic decision making
may exceed the benefits of greater impartiality. Similarly, strict le-
gal or exchange rules may limit self-dealing but in the process stifle
a large number of beneficial transactions. Because monitoring
mechanisms are costly, no presumption should exist that they are
always beneficial or that they will be used by all firms in identical
proportions.
Thus, some firms may rely heavily on independent directors;
others, on closely linking managerial compensation to the perform-
ance of the firm's outstanding securities; and still others, on locat-
ing in a jurisdiction with more stringent regulation. Each of these
decisions may be optimal for different firms. Similarly, the impor-
tance of the market for corporate control as a monitoring mecha-
nism may vary for different firms. The choice between a rule of one
share, one vote and dual class common stock depends in large part
on the importance of the market for corporate control as a moni-
toring device for a particular firm.
B. The Rule of One Share, One Vote
The vast majority of publicly held corporations have limited
the right to vote to shareholders (except in situations of financial
distress) and have attached one vote to every share. This is true
for firms regardless of where they are listed, even though firms
listed on the AMEX or the NASDAQ system could have chosen an
alternative rule.
Shareholders (rather than, say, employees or creditors) typi-
cally have the right to vote because they are the group with the
best incentives (collective action problems to one side) to maximize
the value of the firm. As residual claimants to the firm's income,
shareholders receive most of the marginal gains and incur most of
the marginal costs from decisions made about how the firm's assets
should be deployed. Thus they will be most directly affected by
managerial decisions that change the value of the firm. Those with
fixed claims, such as debtholders, by contrast, are only concerned
about the probability of bankruptcy. As a result, debtholders' in-
centives to maximize the value of the firm generally will be inferior
to those of shareholders.
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While shareholders as a class typically have the best incentives
to maximize firm value, not all shareholders are identical. Those
with a large stake in the venture have much better incentives than
those with a tiny stake because they reap more of the gains and
bear more of the costs from abnormally good or bad performance.
The rule of one share, one vote reflects this economic reality by
assigning votes, and thus the ability to monitor the managers, in
direct proportion to shareholders' stake in the venture.
In most cases, the collective action problem faced by dispersed
shareholders renders voting relatively ineffective as a monitoring
mechanism. Nevertheless, managers realize that they are being
monitored by those who have the best incentives (that is, the larg-
est stakes), and also realize that the collective action problem can
be overcome at any time by the accumulation of shares and exer-
cise of the attached votes. Managers' knowledge that they can be
ousted by the exercise of these votes provides them an incentive to
maximize the value of the firm.
C. Dual Class Common Stock and Economic Incentives
The one share, one vote rule enhances voting as a monitoring
mechanism because it facilitates transfers of control. Dual class
common stock, by contrast, makes hostile takeovers-one type of
transfer of control-more difficult because it allows insiders to
hold 51 percent of the votes without holding 51 percent of the eq-
uity. For a given equity base, then, insiders must commit a smaller
fraction of their own wealth to retain a controlling interest in the
firm.
For this reason, the question why firms adopt dual class com-
mon stock breaks down into two questions. First, is it efficient for
insiders in some cases to retain control? Second, is it ever efficient
for insiders to retain control by holding 51 percent of a superior
voting stock rather than holding 51 percent of the entire equity
base? These questions are discussed below.
1. The value of control to insiders. Managers of a particular
firm may desire to retain control for several reasons that are en-
tirely consistent with the goal of maximizing the shareholders'
wealth. First, insiders may simply value control more than outsid-
ers. This explains why family-run firms or firms still controlled by
the founding entrepreneur often issue dual class common stock or
are reluctant to issue new equity when doing so would dilute their
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own holdings.2 It is even possible that the market value of the
shares of such firms would be higher if the family or founding en-
trepreneur would relinquish control. In this event, the family or
entrepreneur is paying for its preference for control in the form of
a higher cost of capital. Of course, the opposite can also be true.
The market value of shares in a firm controlled by a family or
founding entrepreneur may be higher if, for example, continuity of
management is valued by investors and there exist alternative gov-
ernance mechanisms to align the interests of managers and
investors.
Second, insider control may increase managers' incentives to
invest in firm-specific human capital.33 Managers frequently must
invest their own time and resources to gain knowledge concerning
a particular firm's investment opportunities, personnel, specific
practices, and organization. Once acquired, these skills are specific
to the particular firm. Firm-specific skills, in turn, make managers
who acquire them more valuable to their particular firm than to
firms generally. Managers' incentive to acquire these firm-specific
skills results from the expectation that they will continue to be
employed by their firm for a long period and thus obtain a return
on their investment.
Stockholders also benefit from the acquisition of firm-specific
skills, since managers who possess them make the firm more valua-
ble. However, managers always run the risk that they will be ter-
minated by shareholders or, more realistically, by a purchaser of
control who might change the use of the firm's assets. The greater
the managers' perceived probability that they may be denied a re-
turn on their firm-specific investments, the less willing they will be
to make them in the first place. Shareholders and managers will
both be worse off in this event, as there will be fewer returns on
firm-specific investments to share.
One method of assuring managers that their firm-specific in-
vestments will not be appropriated is to allow insiders to retain
control. This is not the only method. Consider, for example, golden
parachutes. The difference between insider control and golden
parachutes is that insider control protects managers from transfers
32 See Harry DeAngelo and Linda DeAngelo, Managerial Ownership of Voting Rights,
14 J. Fin. Econ. 33 (1985).
.3 See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Inte-
gration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & Econ. 297
(1978); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J. L. & Econ. 233 (1979).
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of control while golden parachutes compensate them in the event a
transfer occurs. Both techniques have costs and benefits as meth-
ods of protecting firm-specific investments.
Golden parachutes may be difficult (costly) to negotiate, and
their enforceability is suspect. They also create a moral hazard. If
managers believe they will be compensated when a transfer of con-
trol occurs, they may take actions, such as running the firm inef-
ficiently, to increase the probability of such an event. Insider con-
trol, by contrast, denies shareholders the ability to receive control
premiums and also denies them the ability to share in the gains
created by the transfer of assets to more highly valued uses. Not-
withstanding these costs of golden parachutes and insider control,
one or both techniques may be beneficial in particular cases to pro-
tect firm-specific investments.
The third possible benefit of insider control is that it decreases
the need for managers to expend resources to convince potential
bidders for control that the current use of the firm's assets is opti-
mal.34 In situations of asymmetric information-where managers
have information that outside investors do not-managers may
have to employ costly signaling devices to communicate their pri-
vate information. Examples of such signaling devices include high
debt-equity ratios, dividend changes, and share repurchases.3 5 The
need to convince outsiders not to attempt a transfer of control also
may affect investment decisions. Managers may choose more "visi-
ble" projects rather than more valuable projects whose value is too
difficult to communicate. If insiders control the firm, these costs
need not be incurred.
Fourth, insider control may allow shareholders of a target cor-
poration to obtain a higher price when a transfer of control does
occur. One difficulty that dispersed shareholders face when con-
fronted with a hostile tender offer is that they are unable to act
collectively. This inability to coordinate makes it impossible for
shareholders to negotiate with the bidder to obtain a better price.
Insider control is a device that overcomes this collective action
problem among the shareholders. Its effect is to force potential ac-
quirors to deal directly with management, who in turn can negoti-
34 See DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 14 J. Fin. Econ. at 33 (cited in note 32).
35 See, e.g., Ronald W. Masulis, The Effects of Capital Structure Change on Security
Prices: A Study of Exchange Offers, 8 J. Fin. Econ. 139 (1980). For a sampling of the large
economic literature on signaling, see John G. Riley, Competitive Signalling, 10 J. Econ. The-
ory 174 (1975); Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Quart. J. Econ. 355 (1973); Joseph
E. Stiglitz, The Theory of "Screening," Education, and the Distribution of Income, 65 Amer.
Econ. Rev. 283 (1975).
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ate on behalf of all shareholders. Granting insiders what amounts
to a veto power over transfers of control is likely to decrease the
number of control transactions but increase the price paid per
transaction. Such action is likely to reduce the wealth of potential
bidders-and perhaps, even shareholders as a class-but may be
rational behavior for shareholders of a particular firm."
2. Dual class voting as a mechanism for preserving insider
control. If every share is entitled to one vote, insiders can retain
control of a firm by holding 51 percent of the outstanding equity.
Why would insiders eschew this alternative in favor of dual class
common stock? One reason is that insiders may simply lack the
personal wealth to maintain 51 percent ownership when the value
of the outstanding equity becomes sufficiently large. Indeed, the
magnitude of most publicly held corporations greatly exceeds the
magnitude of most personal fortunes. Outside equity enables the
firm to pursue investment opportunities that have expected re-
turns higher than alternative uses of capital regardless of the size
of insiders' wealth.
Even an owner/manager who has sufficient personal wealth to
purchase 51 percent of the outstanding equity may prefer not to do
so. Outside investors with access to capital markets can diversify
risk more efficiently than insiders who already have a large per-
centage of their wealth tied up in their firm in the form of their
human capital. Diversified investors in effect charge a lower price
to bear risk than would a less diversified owner/manager.17 Al-
lowing these more efficient, outside risk bearers to share the risk
lowers the cost of risk to the firm.
This risk sharing arrangement between owner/managers and
outside investors benefits managers and stockholders, and also so-
ciety as a whole. Society benefits because profitable investment op-
portunities are pursued even if they are risky or will not generate
cash flows until sometime in the future. Owner/managers who fi-
nance projects with their personal wealth, by contrast, will tend to
choose less risky projects-even if they have a lower present
value-because of their inability to diversify. Similarly, owner/
36 On the tension between which strategy is optimal for a particular firm and which is
optimal for shareholders as a whole, see Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart, Takeover
Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation, 11 Bell J. Econ. 42
(1980); Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender
Offers, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1982).
37 Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26
J. L. & Econ. 327 (1983); Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, Organizational Forms and
Investment Decisions, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 101 (1985).
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managers will tend to choose projects that produce returns during
their tenure with the firm-even if these projects have a lower pre-
sent value than projects with more extended payoffs. The tendency
of firms financed with equity38 to choose investment projects under
the market value rule-to choose those projects with the highest
net present value-increases the production of goods and services
in the economy as a whole.
Dual class common stock allows insiders to obtain the benefits
of outside equity financing while still retaining control over the
firm. This is not to suggest that all firms should employ dual class
common stock. The cost of dual class common stock is that the
effectiveness of the market for corporate control as a monitoring
device is reduced. Whether this substantial cost is outweighed by
the benefits of dual class voting is an empirical question that is
discussed below.
3. Other uses of dual class common stock. Dual class com-
mon stock is employed for reasons other than making transfers of
control more difficult. General Motors' new classes of E and H
stock are examples of dual class common stock with a completely
different purpose. The dividends and other distributions to the
holders of these stocks are tied to the performance of acquired di-
visions, and so the prices of these stocks reflect the prospects of
these divisions rather than the whole of the firm. In addition, hold-
ers of these shares have inferior voting rights to those of stockhold-
ers in General Motors. Because the value of these stocks is tied to
particular divisions of General Motors rather than General Motors
as a whole, their holders have less incentive to monitor the man-
agement of General Motors. Inferior voting rights reflect this de-
creased incentive to monitor management relative to other share-
holders of General Motors.
D. Dual Class Common Stock and Corporate Democracy
Some may argue that unequal voting rights are undesirable
because they are inconsistent with the principle of "corporate de-
mocracy." This argument, however, is fundamentally flawed. All
firms, including corporations, consist of contractual relationships
freely entered into by economic actors to maximize their joint wel-
fare. Who has the right to vote and how and when the vote can be
exercised are rights that are typically allocated by contract. In con-
38 I do not discuss here the costs and benefits of debt financing. For a discussion, see
Jensen and Meckling, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (cited in note 21).
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trast to governmental democracies-which are usually designed to
serve broader goals than wealth maximization-the optimal voting
rules for any particular firm are those that maximize its value.
Two important implications follow from this insight. First, no
reason exists to believe that the optimal voting rules for publicly
held corporations engaged in the production of goods and services
will be identical to the voting rules for representative governments.
Indeed, there is little similarity between the voting rules for the
two institutions. For example, most corporate actors-employees,
bondholders, suppliers, preferred stockholders, and manag-
ers-have no votes even though they all are investors in the firm.
For common stockholders, the group that does vote, the most com-
mon structure is one share, one vote-not one person, one vote as
in the political context. Thus votes in the corporate, but not politi-
cal, context are typically assigned by reference to the extent of
property ownership. Just as there is no reason to believe that votes
in the political arena should be assigned according to wealth, so
there is no reason to believe that principles from political democ-
racy should serve as a model for corporate governance.
The second implication that follows from the economics of
voting rules is that the rules for all firms need not be identical.
The optimal voting rule depends on which rules will maximize the
value of the firm; different rules may be optimal for different types
of firms. Participants in general partnerships, for example, typi-
cally have equal votes while most participants in limited partner-
ships have no votes. Similarly, the voting rights of investors in dual
class firms differ from those of investors in firms with only one
class of common stock. These observed differences in voting rights
may reflect differences in optimal voting rules for different firms.
Moreover, differences in nominal voting rights understate dif-
ferences across firms in effective voting rights.3 9 Effective voting
rights depend on the concentration of the ownership of votes. For
example, the holder of 10 percent of the outstanding shares of a
publicly held corporation that has the rule of one share, one vote
may have very powerful voting rights if shares are widely dis-
persed, but virtually no power if there is another shareholder who
owns 51 percent of the outstanding shares.
Contractual arrangements also may affect voting rights. Cu-
mulative voting, voting trusts, and standstill agreements are all ex-
amples of arrangements that, like dual class common stock, have
"' The differences between nominal and effective voting rights are emphasized in De-
Angelo and DeAngelo, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 33 (cited in note 32).
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the effect of altering effective voting rights. Holding companies can
have a similar effect. For example, consider an investor who owns
50.1 percent of the votes of a holding company, which in turns
owns 50.1 percent of the votes of another firm. Under a rule of one
share, one vote, such an investor has effective control over the sub-
sidiary firm with only about a 25 percent interest in its cash flows.
In sum, it is not unusual for different types of firms to have
different voting rules. Nor is it unusual for effective voting rights
to differ across firms that all of which nominally have a rule of one
share, one vote. All of these arrangements-as well as the rule of
one share, one vote itself-are inconsistent with the political model
of one person, one vote. Dual class common stock is simply another
form of voting arrangement that affects effective voting rights. The
misguided analogy to political democracy provides no basis for
prohibiting dual class common stock, or any other voting rule, that
has the effect of maximizing the value of certain firms.
E. Dual Class Common Stock: The Evidence
1. Characteristics of firms with dual class common stock. A
small percentage of publicly traded firms employ dual class com-
mon stock; that percentage has fluctuated over time but has not
grown appreciably larger. 40 The small number of firms that have
dual class common stock is significant. The NASD, AMEX, and
the laws of most states permit the listing of dual class common
stock. Thus the fact that most firms utilize the rule of one share,
one vote strongly suggests that dual class common stock is not op-
timal for the vast majority of publicly held firms. At the same
time, the fact that the rule of one share, one vote is desirable for
most firms does not mean it is desirable for all firms.
A number of researchers have studied the types of firms that
40 Indeed, there were more dual class firms in 1970 than in 1980 and more still in 1960.
The decrease in dual class firms over this period is a result of both acquisitions and expira-
tion of the time period for dual class common stock as stipulated in corporate charters.
Recently, however, the use of dual class common has become somewhat popular. Since 1980,
at least 37 firms have issued limited voting stock, and 23 of these occurred in 1983 or 1984.
See M. Megan Partch, The Creation of a Class of Limited Voting Common Stock and
Shareholder Wealth, J. Fin. Econ. (forthcoming 1987) (table 1). As of October, 1985, approx-
imately 100 of the slightly over 4,000 companies traded on NASDAQ (or about 2.5 percent)
had multiple classes of common stock. As of July, 1984, approximately 50 of the over 900
firms listed on the American Stock Exchange (or about 6 percent) had two or more classes
of common stock outstanding. A handful of firms listed on the NYSE also have adopted
dual capitalization pending resolution of the controversy over listing standards on the
NYSE. See DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 14 J. Fin. Econ. at 54 (cited in note 32).
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have adopted dual class common stock.41 These studies reveal that
firms that adopt dual class common tend to have certain common
and related characteristics. First, managers of dual class firms (de-
fined as corporate officers and their families) tend to own approxi-
mately 55 percent of the voting rights.42 Indeed, one motivation for
recapitalizations appears to be the desire to obtain voting control.
Thus management ownership of voting rights is significantly
greater after recapitalizations than before.43 Second, managers of
dual class firms own a greater percentage of votes than rights to
cash flows. Nevertheless, managers tend to have a significant eq-
uity stake in the firm; the median cash flow interest is 24 percent.44
Third, dual class firms tend to exhibit highly concentrated owner-
ship of voting rights. For the typical dual class firm, approximately
96 percent of all stockholders own shares of the inferior voting
class.
45
Fourth, dual class firms are characterized by a significant
amount of family control. In many dual class firms, two or more
related individuals (by blood or marriage) currently hold top man-
agement positions and family members have sometimes held such
positions for several generations. 46 Fifth, most dual class firms are
conservatively leveraged. The average ratio of long-term debt to
total assets for dual class firms is approximately 0.1. 47 Sixth, dual
class firms frequently issue new equity within a short time after
recapitalizations. 48 Thus managers' desire to issue new equity with-
out diluting their proportionate ownership of voting rights also ap-
pears to be a motivation for recapitalizations.
41 The most important studies are DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 33 (cited
in note 32); Ronald C. Lease, John J. McConnell, and Wayne H. Mikkelson, The Market
Value of Control in Publicly-Traded Corporations, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 439 (1983); and Partch,
J. Fin. Econ. (cited in note 40).
42 See DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 14 J. Fin. Econ. at 45 (cited in note 32).
43 It is also true, however, that managers own a large percentage of the outstanding
votes (an average of 48.6 percent) prior to recapitalizations. See Partch, J. Fin. Econ. (cited
in note 40) (table 3).
44 See DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 14 J. Fin. Econ. at 47 (cited in note 32).
41 Id. at 41.
46 Id. at 30.
47 Id. at 41.
4 Approximately one-third of dual class firms issue new equity within one year after
the creation of the limited class voting stock. Partch, J. Fin. Econ. (cited in note 40) (section
2.4). This figure should be compared with the results of another study that found that only
17 percent of a random sample of industrial firms actually completed sales of common stock
publicly at least once within an eleven-year period. See Wayne H. Mikkelson and M. Megan
Parteh, Valuation Effects of Security Offerings and the Issuance Process, 15 J. Fin. Econ.
31, 36 (1987) (table 2).
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These characteristics of dual class firms are consistent with
the theory of insider control discussed above. Dual class common
stock enables managers to control a majority of votes without own-
ing 51 percent of the outstanding shares. The large family involve-
ment in many dual class firms suggests one reason why insiders
value control. Protecting firm-specific investments of human capi-
tal and economizing on the costs of communicating information to
investors to avoid takeovers may, as discussed above, be other rea-
sons. The highly concentrated ownership of votes in dual class
firms further suggests that such arrangements may overcome col-
lective action problems faced by dispersed shareholders.
The frequency with which newly recapitalized dual class firms
issue new equity is also consistent with the analysis of the costs
and benefits of control. Constraints based on wealth as well as lack
of diversification may make managers reluctant to pursue invest-
ment projects if obtaining the necessary financing would dilute
their voting rights. Thus, dual class common stock enables insid-
ers, who in many cases already have control, to finance new
projects without fear of loss of control.49
Finally, the theory of insider control predicts that the reduced
effectiveness of the market for corporate control as a monitoring
device would lead dual class firms to rely more heavily on alterna-
tive monitoring mechanisms. The evidence seems to support this
view. In particular, the family ownership of many dual class firms
may act as a substitute for the market for corporate control. The
obligation that family members feel to each other may act as a
constraint on self-interested behavior that reduces the value of the
firm. Similarly, the significant equity interest of managers in dual
class firms, even though less in percentage terms than their owner-
ship of votes, tends to align the interests of managers and
investors.
2. Pricing of dual class common stock. Researchers have
studied the relative prices of multiple classes of equity securities
with unequal voting rights.50 The typical procedure is to consider
"' The frequency with which newly recapitalized dual class firms issue new equity also
acts as a safeguard for investors. Because capital markets penalize inefficient arrangements,
when owner/managers go to the capital market frequently, their incentive to adopt voting
rules that are harmful to investors is reduced.
50 See Lease, McConnell, and Mikkelson, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 439 (cited in note 41). Haim
Levy, Economic Evaluation of Voting Power of Common Stock, 38 J. Fin. 79 (1982), pro-
vides evidence for the Israel Stock Exchange that is similar to that discussed in this article.
DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 33 (cited in note 32), examined forty-five dual
class firms, but focused mainly on other characteristics of these firms.
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firms for which (1) both classes of stock are publicly traded in the
same markets; and (2) the two classes differ only with respect to
voting rights-that is, each class has identical rights to any cash
distributions. The purpose of this procedure is to isolate the value
of the vote to the investors.
Lease, McConnell, and Mikkelson (LM&M) studied the share
prices of thirty companies that had two classes of publicly traded
common stock outstanding during the period from 1940 to
1978-classes that had unequal voting rights but were otherwise
identical. Twenty-six of these firms had two classes of common
stock and no other voting securities. Four of the firms had voting
preferred stock in addition to the two classes of common stock.
Month-end prices for the two classes of common stock from
the same day of trading were used to calculate the value of voting
rights. Specifically, LM&M calculated for each firm the ratio of the
superior voting stock's month-end price to the inferior voting
stock's price at the end of the same month. They then took the
average of these ratios. If investors valued superior and inferior
voting shares equally, this average ratio should be one. If the supe-
rior voting shares were more highly valued, the average ratio
should exceed one and if the superior voting shares were valued
less, the average ratio should be less than one.
For the twenty-six firms that had two classes of common stock
and no other class of voting securities, LM&M found that the aver-
age observed ratio of month-end prices was greater than one. The
average price premium placed on the shares with superior voting
rights relative to the class with inferior voting rights was 5.4 per-
cent. For the four firms with voting preferred in addition to two
classes of common stock, however, they found that the average ob-
served ratio of month-end prices was less than one. The average
discount of the superior voting class of common stock was 1.25 per-
cent. Both results are statistically significant.51
The existence of these premiums and discounts may seem sur-
prising. The price of a security, like any other asset, should reflect
the present value of future cash flows. Since the sample was con-
structed to include only those securities with guaranteed identical
rights to future cash flows, finance theory predicts that the prices
of the different classes of common stock should be identi-
cal-regardless of voting rights.
A possible explanation for the premiums and discounts is that
Lease, McConnell, and Mikkelson, 11 J. Fin. Econ. at 469 (cited in note 41).
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the holders of one class of securities rationally anticipate different
net cash flows regardless of the charter provision guaranteeing
identical payoffs. LM&M examined various possibilities. They
found that the corporate charters of the firms studied expressly
forbid cash buy backs at premium prices and sales of new securi-
ties at discounts that would benefit one class and not the other.
Nevertheless, the receipt of different benefits is still possible. For
example, those with voting control may anticipate a premium price
for their shares in the event of a takeover bid. Alternatively, those
with control may be able to benefit by directing the firm's re-
sources to their own gain. A firm, for example, may purchase in-
puts from (or sell outputs to) another firm owned by the control-
ling stockholders at above (or below) market prices.
Some direct evidence on these points is provided by DeAngelo
and DeAngelo. 52 They examined corporate takeover payments to
both classes of stock for firms that had dual classes outstanding
when acquired. Differential compensation was paid in one-third of
the cases they studied. 53 These instances of differential payoffs in
the event of an acquisition may help explain why investors are
willing to pay a premium for the superior voting class. The possi-
bility of a higher payoff when acquisitions occur also may explain
why shareholders who exchange voting shares for limited voting
shares frequently receive rights to a slightly higher dividend. The
higher dividend is compensation for the lower expected payoff in
the event of an acquisition.54
3. The effect of dual class common stock on investors'
wealth. Firms may issue limited or non-voting stock in two circum-
stances. They might offer such securities when they go public. Al-
51 DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 33 (cited in note 32).
5' They discovered thirty such events that occurred between 1960 and 1980. Of these,
they found no explicit direct or indirect payments in twelve cases. In six cases, they found
that different compensation, which was difficult to value, was paid to different classes (an
example is the sale of a division at book value to a manager). In eight cases, both classes
received equal compensation per share as a result of the acquisition-even though the infer-
ior class had been entitled to a slightly higher dividend payout. Finally, they identified four
cases in which the superior class received explicit (and often substantial) premiums per
share. See DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 14 J. Fin. Econ. at 57 (cited in note 32).
LM&M's finding that superior voting shares sell at a small discount when there is a
class of voting preferred outstanding is more of a puzzle. The small sample size (only four
firms) suggests that their finding may be an aberration. If it is not, one possible explanation
is that the value of control in some situations may be negative. If the holders of control
gained indirect benefits from control in the past, for example, they may face costly legal
claims. If a more complicated ownership structure (such as a structure with two classes of
common stock and a class of voting preferred) makes costly legal claims more likely, this
may cause superior voting shares to sell at a discount.
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ternatively, firms that are already publicly owned may recapitalize
by offering such securities to existing shareholders or the general
public.
As a theoretical matter, initial public offerings of limited or
non-voting stock can never harm investors. The price of a security
when a firm goes public reflects the value of that security to inves-
tors. Investors only purchase a security when they estimate that
the value of whatever rights and cash flows it carries equals or ex-
ceeds its price. If investors value voting rights and a firm fails to
provide them, then the firm's securities simply sell at a lower price.
The organizers of the firm may be worse off, but investors are not.
Recapitalizations pose a different issue. Such recapitalizations
may increase investors' wealth if, for example, they protect firm-
specific investments of human capital or they signal that the firm
has valuable investment opportunities that will be financed by new
equity issues. This possibility can be described as the shareholder
interests explanation of recapitalizations. Alternatively, recapitali-
zations may reduce investors' wealth by insulating incumbent
management from the discipline of the market for corporate con-
trol. This possibility can be described as the management en-
trenchment explanation of recapitalizations.
To distinguish between these two explanations for dual class
common stock, Megan Partch studied forty-four recapitalizations
that occurred from 1962 to 1984 in which a publicly traded firm
issued a new class of limited voting stock.5 She found that the
average stock price reaction to the announcement of plans to cre-
ate dual class common stock was positive, and that investors ex-
perienced larger positive wealth effects when insiders already
owned a large percentage of votes prior to the recapitalization.
Thus, the market responds more positively to proposals to issue
limited voting stock when the motivation of the recapitalization is
55 Partch, J. Fin. Econ. (cited in note 40). Specifically, Partch examined the changes in
wealth experienced by investors on and between certain "event" dates. The event dates
were the date of the board of directors' meeting where the proposal was made, the date of
the proxy mailing on which the proposal was made public, and the date of the shareholders'
meeting on which the proposal was approved.
On the most important day, the day the recapitalization proposal was announced, inves-
tors experienced a positive and statistically significant return of 1.2 percent. Investors also
experienced a positive and statistically significant return on other event dates. The overall
return experienced by investors from the time of announcement to the time of approval was
negative, but not statistically significant. The overall returns from announcement to ap-
proval was a less direct test of the wealth effects of creating limited voting stock than the
returns on event days. The reason is that the interval between announcement and approval
necessarily includes events unrelated to the creation of limited voting stock.
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to maintain rather than gain control.56 Thus shareholders seem to
be voting rationally when they approve recapitalizations creating
dual class common stock.
In another study, Gregg Jarrell has found that NYSE listed
firms experienced abnormal losses following the announcement of
proposals to create dual class common stock.57 The reason for such
losses may be the risk of delisting if dual class common stock is
adopted. This might explain the negative returns, except that it is
a puzzle why firms risk delisting (and shareholders approve) if do-
ing so is wealth-reducing. One possibility is the very fact that firms
would risk delisting signals the market that the firm has particu-
larly bad prospects. Another possibility is that the market for cor-
porate control is more important as a monitoring device for NYSE
firms because they tend to be larger and have lower insider hold-
ings. The proposed recapitalization, under this view, is perceived
by investors as a form of managerial entrenchment. Even if this
view were correct, however, it would not explain why shareholders
approve recapitalizations for NYSE firms.
With the exception of NYSE firms, the evidence suggests that
recapitalizations creating dual classes of common stock are consis-
tent with shareholders' interests. This result, however, should be
interpreted with some caution because Partch's findings are pre-
liminary and have not yet been replicated by other investigators.
In addition, the potential exists for particular recapitalizations to
harm stockholders. Nevertheless, the evidence does demonstrate
that for an important class of firms, recapitalizations have been
beneficial. Based on the current evidence, therefore, no basis exists
for the conclusion that investors as a class would benefit from a
blanket prohibition of the use of dual classes of common stock.
IV. DuAL CLASS COMMON STOCK AND DEFENSIVE TACTICS IN
RESPONSE TO TAKEOVERS
Considerable evidence now exists that shareholders of target
companies experience significant increases in wealth as a result of
hostile takeovers. On average, a target's shareholders experience an
increase in the value of their shares of approximately thirty per-
11 Significantly, for the entire sample, Partch found that insiders controlled an average
of 48.6 percent of the votes at the time of the recapitalization.
- Gregg A. Jarrell, The Stock Price Effects of NYSE Delisting for Violating Corporate
Governance Rules (unpublished manuscript, Dec. 1984, on file with The University of Chi-
cago Law Review).
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cent as a result of a successful takeover attempt.5 8 These gains are,
on average, lost in their entirety if the target's managers are able
to defeat the offer by engaging in defensive tactics and the target is
not acquired by another bidder.59 Moreover, several studies indi-
cate that shareholders of target corporations typically experience a
statistically significant decrease in the value of their shares when
management engages in defensive tactics.60
Overall, the evidence indicates that shareholders of targets
benefit from takeovers and are harmed by defensive tactics that
make takeovers more difficult. Shareholders of bidding firms and
shareholders as a class also are likely losers if defensive tactics
cause fewer acquisitions to occur and make those that do occur
more expensive. As a result, several commentators have argued
that shareholders' wealth would be maximized if managers did not
engage in defensive tactics to resist hostile takeovers.61
Concern has been expressed that dual class common stock
may be another form of defensive tactic that operates to the detri-
ment of investors. Without question, there is some basis for this
concern, particularly with respect to the NYSE listed firms that
have risked delisting. Nevertheless, to equate dual class common
stock with defensive tactics taken in response to perceived take-
over threats is misleading for several reasons. First, the claim is
not factually accurate. Many firms have had dual classes of com-
mon stock for several generations-some from their inception as
5S Michael C. Jensen and Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The
Scientific Evidence, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 5, 10 (1983) (summarizing the results of thirteen studies
of takeovers).
5, See Michael Bradley, Anand Desai, and E. Harv Kim, The Rationale Behind In-
terfirm Tender Offers: Information or Synergy?, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 183, 194 (1983).
60 For example, Dann and DeAngelo studied acquisitions, divestitures, issuances of ad-
ditional voting stock, and repurchases of voting stock by target firms in response to hostile
takeover attempts. They found a statistically significant abnormal return of 2.33 percent on
average when these changes were announced. Larry Y. Dann and Harry DeAngelo, Corpo-
rate Financial Policy and Corporate Control: A Study of Defensive Adjustments in Asset
and Ownership Structure (Working Paper No. MERC 86-11, U. Rochester Grad. Sch.
Mgmt., Aug. 1986). See also Paul H. Malatesta and Ralph A. Walking, Poison Pill Securi-
ties: Stockholder Wealth, Profitability, and Ownership Structure (Working Paper, U. Wash-
ington, Sept. 1986); Larry Y. Dann and Harry DeAngelo, Standstill Agreements, Privately
Negotiated Stock Repurchases, and the Market for Corporate Control, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 275
(1983). Some contrary evidence also exists. See Gregg A. Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Liti-
gation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a Merge?, 28 J. L. & Econ. 151 (1985). Jarrell
finds that when litigation leads to additional bids from rival acquiring firms, target share-
holders earn abnormal positive returns.
"1 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Search Theory and the Tender Offer Auction, 2 J. L. Econ.
& Org. 229 (1986); Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Tar-
get's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161 (1981).
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publicly held firms. DeAngelo and DeAngelo found that the me-
dian firm in their sample had a dual class voting structure for
about twenty years.6 2 Similarly, Partch found that no firms in her
sample were the subject of a takeover attempt in the two years
prior to the recapitalization. 3 Furthermore, many recapitalizations
are better understood as attempts to maintain control of a firm in
light of anticipated additional equity financing rather than at-
tempts to prevent outsiders from taking over the firm. Transfers of
control in such cases are not at issue; the issue is whether the firm,
given that there will not be a transfer of control, will be able to
finance new projects with equity. Moreover, as the example of
General Motors demonstrates, shares with limited voting rights are
sometimes issued for reasons having nothing to do with the pre-
vention of transfers of control.
Second, not all transactions that make hostile takeovers more
difficult are necessarily harmful to investors. No one could credibly
argue, for example, that the failure to take a firm public is necessa-
rily harmful to investors. Similarly, the evidence suggests that go-
ing private is beneficial to investors.6 4 The relevant issue is the im-
portance of the market for corporate control as a monitoring
mechanism in comparison with other monitoring mechanisms for
any particular firm.
A third reason why dual class common stock should not neces-
sarily be equated with defensive tactics to fend off takeovers is
that many dual class firms are eventually acquired. 5 The dual
class structure may allow management to negotiate more effec-
tively on behalf of investors.6
Finally, dual class common stock varies from other defensive
tactics adopted in response to takeover threats both in terms of
the procedural safeguards involved and in their effect on investors'
wealth. Most defensive tactics in response to takeovers tend to be
changes that managers can implement quickly and without the ap-
proval of shareholders. These types of defensive tactics tend to
have a negative effect on shareholders' wealth. Recapitalizations
creating dual classes of common stock, by contrast, typically must
62 DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 14 J. Fin. Econ. at 53 (cited in note 32).
63 Partch, J. Fin. Econ. (cited in note 40) (section 2.4).
Harry DeAngelo, Linda DeAngelo, and Edward M. Rice, Going Private: Minority
Freezeouts and Stockholder Wealth, 27 J. L. & Econ. 367 (1984).
65 DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 14 J. Fin. Econ. at 57 (cited in note 32).
66 It is not clear, however, that actions by a target's management that maximize the
price paid per offer necessarily maximize the welfare of shareholders as a class. See note 36
and accompanying text above.
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be approved by shareholders. And most importantly (with the ex-
ception of NYSE listed firms), there is no evidence that the imple-
mentation of dual classes of common stock reduces investors'
wealth.6
V. A NOTE ON THE NYSE AND THE ONE SHARE, ONE VOTE RULE
The NYSE is now attempting to change its historic policy
against listing dual class common stock. The stated reason for this
possible change is competitive pressure from the other exchanges.
The above discussion suggests that the competitive effects of a
change in rules by the NYSE are more complex than might first
appear. To be sure, a change in rules might allow the NYSE to
keep listings of firms that want to adopt dual class common stock.
The preliminary evidence indicates, however, that recapitalizations
for NYSE firms adopting dual class common stock have caused
large negative wealth effects. Assuming that these effects are not
caused by the threat of delisting, if NYSE rules are changed to
permit these large negative wealth effects to occur, listing on the
NYSE will be less valuable to investors. All else being equal, the
NYSE will lose listings as a result or be forced to charge less for
the transactional and ancillary services it provides. Thus, the
NYSE appears to face a clear tradeoff in deciding whether to
change its rule.
Put differently, the NYSE's historic rule can be seen as a
means whereby management could make a commitment to stock-
holders of certain types of firms that takeovers would not be re-
sisted by creating dual classes of common stock. Tough delisting
standards made this commitment all the more credible. Under this
interpretation, the change in the NYSE rule will allow managers of
certain firms to break this commitment. Thus, the proposed
change may have certain short-term gains for the NYSE but may
also impose long-term losses, because a bonding mechanism align-
ing the interests of managers and investors will no longer be
available.
There is, however, another, equally plausible interpretation of
67 In this sense, there is a similarity between dual class common stock and antitakeover
amendments that also must be approved by shareholders and generally do not have signifi-
cant effects on wealth. Regarding the evidence on the effects of antitakeover amendments
on shareholders' wealth, see Scott C. Linn and John J. McConnell, An Empirical Investiga-
tion of the Impact of "Antitakeover" Amendments on Common Stock Prices, 11 J. Fin.
Econ. 361 (1983); Harry DeAngelo and Edward M. Rice, Antitakeover Charter Amendments
and Stockholder Wealth, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 329 (1983).
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the effect of the NYSE's proposed change in voting rules. Under
this alternative interpretation, the change will increase the flexibil-
ity of firms listed on the NYSE. In theory, this increase in flexibil-
ity may be beneficial for at least certain firms. The proposed rule
change, in other words, might allow NYSE listed firms to obtain
the benefits of dual class common stock to the same extent as non-
NYSE listed firms.
The existing empirical evidence does not generate unambigu-
ous predictions of what the consequences will be if the NYSE
changes its rule. While recapitalizations of firms listed on the
NYSE appear to have caused large negative wealth effects, the evi-
dence is meager. And, as discussed above, the negative wealth ef-
fects may have been caused by the threat of delisting rather than
any problem inherent in dual class stock. The evidence to date is
not sufficient to generate a meaningful prediction of what the
wealth effects will be of recapitalizations for NYSE firms if these
firms do not risk delisting.
Similarly, it is not obvious that a change in the NYSE rule will
prevent managers from making credible commitments to share-
holders of certain firms not to resist takeovers by creating dual
classes of common stock. The same commitment can be made by
contract, perhaps in the corporate charter with special provisions
defining the rules for amendment. In short, it is simply not possi-
ble at this stage to predict what the ultimate effect will be of a
change in the NYSE's prohibition on the listing of dual class com-
mon stock.
CONCLUSION
Dual class common stock appears to be beneficial for investors
of a small minority of firms. Accordingly, the willingness of certain
organized exchanges to list the dual classes of common stock of
these firms similarly has been beneficial. It does not follow, how-
ever, that all exchanges should have the same governance rules. It
is impossible to predict whether the proposed change of the
NYSE's historic prohibition on the listing of dual class common
stock will, if implemented, harm or benefit investors.
